In recent months, debates over the independence of government agencies and the limits of presidential authority have moved from academic journals into courtrooms and campaign rhetoric. High-profile firings, pending Supreme Court cases, and intensifying partisan conflict have placed once-obscure oversight institutions at the center of questions about how, and whether, government accountability can endure.
“It’s hard to keep someone honest when that someone can fire you or otherwise do you harm,” said University of Virginia Law School professor Michael Gilbert. “Watchdogs generally have, and need, some level of independence from the rest of government.”
Independent oversight bodies in the United States play a quiet but essential role in safeguarding democratic governance. At moments of heightened political polarization and institutional stress, their roles become especially visible. And when oversight weakens, corruption becomes harder to detect and public trust in government erodes, with long-term consequences for democratic stability.
When oversight weakens, corruption becomes harder to detect and public trust in government erodes, with long-term consequences for democratic stability.
Though varied in design and mission, these institutions share a common purpose: to detect fraud, expose mismanagement, and resist the kinds of political pressures that can enable corruption.
What Watchdog Agencies Do That Other Institutions Cannot
“It’s important to distinguish between two forms of accountability,” said UVA politics professor Daniel Gingerich, who served as co-lead on the Karsh Institute’s Corruption, Ethics, Accountability, and the Rule of Law (CLEAR) Lab. “The first is vertical accountability, which refers to the relationship between rulers and the ruled. In a democracy, elections are the primary mechanism for vertical accountability. The second is horizontal accountability, which involves holding one organ of government accountable to another.”
Watchdog agencies exist to carry out this second function. “They have the mandate and technical expertise to identify acts of fraud and corruption that other organs of government might not have the time or the capacity to detect,” Gingerich said. “By doing so, they play a crucial role in maintaining horizontal accountability.”
“[Watchdog agencies] have the mandate and technical expertise to identify acts of fraud and corruption that other organs of government might not have the time or the capacity to detect.”
Effective oversight depends on institutional distance from political power, whether achieved through formally independent bodies like the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), or through internal watchdogs such as offices of inspectors general operating within agencies.
“They perform different roles,” said Gilbert, “but a core function is to police integrity. The GAO, for example, attempts to counteract fraud in the disbursement of federal funds. Fraud and corruption can go hand in hand.”
Law and Political Norms
Even with established oversight, independence does not emerge automatically. It is created and sustained through a combination of legal safeguards, institutional design, and political norms.
“Key positions should be filled by career civil servants with tenure protections,” said Gingerich. “Political appointments should be limited, and when they are instituted, their terms should not align with the electoral calendar.”
U.S. law and norms also attempt to protect employees from political retaliation. “Federal law makes it somewhat difficult to remove inspectors general from their positions,” said Gilbert, who also was a faculty member working in the CLEAR Lab. “Any president needs to give 30 days’ notice of the removal and provide Congress with a ‘substantive rationale.’”
Norms can reinforce—or undermine—these legal protections. “President Ronald Reagan fired a bunch of inspectors general upon taking office, and this caused a bipartisan furor,” added Gilbert. “Since then, the norm has been for presidents to retain inspectors general.”
“President Ronald Reagan fired a bunch of inspectors general upon taking office, and this caused a bipartisan furor. Since then, the norm has been for presidents to retain inspectors general.”
When such norms erode, watchdog independence can quickly weaken, even if the formal legal structure remains intact. Ultimately, it is both the law and political norms that determine whether a watchdog agency operates independently in practice, not just on paper.
Trust and Democratic Stability
Strong watchdog agencies are about more than exposing misconduct. They shape how democracy functions over time. “If they operate transparently and with political independence,” Gingerich said, “then they send a positive message to citizens that the government is a good steward of resources and that no group of individuals is above the law.”
Moreover, by countering fraud, mismanagement, and corruption, oversight can improve the system. “Without watchdogs, government may perform worse and public trust may decline,” said Gilbert.
The absence of effective oversight sends a signal. “When watchdogs are weak or dysfunctional, those in control of executive power are effectively unconstrained by law,” Gingerich said. “Inoperative watchdogs create a scenario where the stakes of elections become huge, since there’s little prospect of accountability once a victor is declared. That all-or-nothing mentality, if given sufficient time, can make democracy itself brittle.”
“When watchdogs are weak or dysfunctional, those in control of executive power are effectively unconstrained by law. If given sufficient time, that can make democracy itself brittle.”
The Limits of Executive Power
From a legal perspective, the future of watchdog independence is closely tied to unresolved constitutional questions about executive authority.
“The GAO and CBO are congressional agencies, meaning they are not subject to control by the president,” said Gilbert. “Consequently, the heads of these agencies are quite independent and can only be removed by impeachment or through a joint resolution of Congress.”
By contrast, most inspectors general operate within executive agencies but can be removed by the president, subject to minimal requirements. This issue is currently the subject of ongoing court cases.
“The Supreme Court just heard Trump v. Slaughter, which could give the president even more control over federal agencies’ personnel,” explained Gilbert, adding that it is likely to be decided in June or July. “Under the Constitution, all executive power traces to the president. Does this mean that the president has complete control over the leaders of executive agencies? The law is not clear on this point. And, of course, people disagree on the correct answer.”